The Subject of Experience

Abstract

Abstract The Subject of Experience is about the self, the person. It discusses the phenomenology of the self (What is the character of self-experience?) and the metaphysics of the self (Does the self exist? If so, what is its nature?), developing an approach to the metaphysics out of the results of the phenomenology. It argues that it is legitimate to say that there is such a thing as the self as distinct from the human being, and asks whether a self can suffer loss by death. It criticizes the popular notion of the narrative self, and, more generally, the use of the notion of narrative in ethics and psychology. It considers the first-person pronoun 'I' and a number of puzzles raised by the phenomena of self-reference and self-knowledge. It examines Locke's, Hume's, and Kant's accounts of the mind and personal identity, and argues that Locke and Hume have been badly misunderstood.

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