SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Reconsidering the principal components of central bank independence: The more the merrier?
7 references·8 citing·35 second hop
Reconsidering the principal components of central bank independence: The more the merrier? (1998)Reconsidering the principal components of…The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence (1995)The Political Economy of Cent…Determinants of inflationary performance: Corporatist structures vs. central bank autonomy (1993)Determinants of inflationary …Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence (1993)Central Bank Independence and…Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes (1992)Measuring the Independence of…Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence (1992)Central Bank Strategy, Credib…Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries (1991)Political and Monetary Instit…The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy (1990)The Political Economy of Amer…Cost of Voting in the American States (2018)Cost of Voting in the America…Monetary institutions and inflation performance: cross-country evidence (2012)Monetary institutions and inf…Quest for the Best: How to Measure Central Bank Independence and Show its Relationship with Inflation (2011)Quest for the Best: How to Me…The Politics of Monetary Policy (2010)The Politics of Monetary Poli…In Search of Successful Inflation Targeting (2009)In Search of Successful Infla…Inflation and Central Bank Independence: A Meta Regression Analysis (2008)Inflation and Central Bank In…Measuring central bank independence: a latent variables approach (2003)Measuring central bank indepe…Central Bank Independence and the Lessons for Transition Economies from Developed and Developing Countries (1999)Central Bank Independence and…The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)On the Determination of the Public Debt (1979)Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism (1995)The monetary dynamics of hyperinflation (1956)Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (1957)Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. (1985)Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions (1995)FOMC VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELECTORAL CYCLES: PARTISAN IDEOLOGY AND PARTISAN LOYALTY (1996)The statistical association between central bank independence and inflation (2013)"General Intelligence," Objectively Determined and Measured (1904)Structural Equations with Latent Variables (1989)Structural Equation Modeling: Concepts, Issues, and Applications. (1996)Measuring the Quality of Bank Regulation and Supervision with an Application to Transition Economies (2004)Two-track diffusion and central bank embeddedness: the politics of Euro adoption in Hungary and the Czech Republic (2006)Vom Extremtyp zum Normalfall? Die schweizerische Konsensusdemokratie im Wandel: Eine Re‐Analyse von Lijpharts Studie für die Schweiz von 1997 bis 2007 (2008)Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy (1983)Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions — Past, present and future (2008)A Long Goodbye to Bismarck? : The Politics of Welfare Reform in Continental Europe (2010)Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set (2016)The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)Fiscal adjustments: lessons from recent history (2010)Do Independent Central Banks Exhibit Varied Behaviour in Election and Non-Election Years?: The Case of Fiscal Policy in Africa (2019)IMF conditionality and central bank independence (2019)The Theory of Economic Regulation (2021)The Civic Culture (1963)The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (1963)Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. (1972)Inflation and Economic Growth (1995)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)Cognitive Dissonance, Status and Growth of the Underclass (2004)Majority Rule, Consensus Building, and the Power of the Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC (2004)Why Is Central Bank Independence So Widely Approved? (2005)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1993Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence1,830 cited
  • 1992Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes1,707 cited
  • 1991Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries1,583 cited
  • 1992Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence1,366 cited
  • 1995The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence539 cited
  • 1990The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy100 cited
  • 1993Determinants of inflationary performance: Corporatist structures vs. central bank autonomy52 cited

Cited by

  • 2018Cost of Voting in the American States76 cited
  • 2010The Politics of Monetary Policy41 cited
  • 2003Measuring central bank independence: a latent variables approach37 cited
  • 1999Central Bank Independence and the Lessons for Transition Economies from Developed and Developing Countries22 cited
  • 2011Quest for the Best: How to Measure Central Bank Independence and Show its Relationship with Inflation17 cited
  • 2012Monetary institutions and inflation performance: cross-country evidence16 cited
  • 2009In Search of Successful Inflation Targeting13 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

2008
Inflation and Central Bank Independence: A Meta Regression Analysis
12 cited