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The Mechanism Is Truthful, Why Aren't You?
8 references·2 citing·42 second hop
The Mechanism Is Truthful, Why Aren't You? (2017)The Mechanism Is Truthful, Why Aren't You?Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism (2013)Bidding for Army Career Speci…What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)What Have We Learned from Mar…School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms (2008)School choice and information…Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism (2008)Leveling the Playing Field: S…EGO UTILITY, OVERCONFIDENCE, AND TASK CHOICE (2006)EGO UTILITY, OVERCONFIDENCE, …School choice: an experimental study (2005)School choice: an experimenta…Matching with Contracts (2005)Matching with ContractsThe Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignThe Redesign of the Matching …The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures (2020)The Limits of Incentives in E…An experimental investigation of preference misrepresentation in the residency match (2018)An experimental investigation…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (2013)Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match (2017)Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism versus Its Alternatives (2019)Politics, markets, and America's schools (1991)Constrained school choice (2009)The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard (2012)School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation (2013)Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1972)Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions (2007)Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (2008)Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment (2012)American Economic Review (2019)A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957)The psychology of interpersonal relations. (1958)Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters (2004)Personality Psychology and Economics (2011)Personality Psychology and Economics (2011)A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (2017)Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Position auctions (2006)Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas (2015)The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match (2017)Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings (2019)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Two-sided markets: a progress report (2006)Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2010)Dilettante or Renaissance Person? How the Order of Job Experiences Affects Hiring in an External Labor Market (2014)The Handbook of experimental economics (1995)What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice (2008)Judgment in Managerial Decision Making (1986)The trouble with overconfidence. (2008)Queue Configurations and Operational Performance: An Interplay Between Customer Ownership and Queue Length Awareness (2021)On cores and indivisibility (1974)Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness (2008)The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)The New York City High School Match (2005)Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2005Matching with Contracts802 cited
  • n.d.The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design757 cited
  • 2006EGO UTILITY, OVERCONFIDENCE, AND TASK CHOICE451 cited
  • 2008What Have We Learned from Market Design?402 cited
  • 2005School choice: an experimental study379 cited
  • 2008Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism346 cited
  • 2008School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms173 cited
  • 2013Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism142 cited

Cited by

  • 2018An experimental investigation of preference misrepresentation in the residency match77 cited
  • 2020The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures69 cited

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