Against Truth-Value Gaps

Michael Glanzberg

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Abstract

Abstract Many things are neither true nor false: shoes and ships and sealing wax, to name a few. But these things are neither true nor false because they are not the kinds of things that can be either. There are also some things that are apt for being true or false. Preferences vary on exactly what these things are. Common candidates include utterances, interpreted sentences paired with contexts, and propositions. Can there be something that is apt to be true or false, but fails to be either This is the question of whether there are substa11tial truth-value Baps. It has been a persistent idea in the philosophy of language that there are substantial truthvalue gaps.

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References

1975How To Do Things With Words 1964ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 1992A theory of focus interpretation 1982The varieties of reference 2014A Minimalist Program for Linguistic Theory 1892Über Sinn und Bedeutung 1989A Natural History of Negation 1955Two Concepts of Rules

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