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0. Introduction Since first proposed as a linguistic term by Trubetzkoy (1939), the notion of markedness has come to occupy a position of considerable importance in phonology and other areas of linguistics. However, since Trubetzkoy’s time, markedness has acquired a much broader meaning. The term “unmarked” is generally synonymous with, for example, simpler, more common, easier to produce, acquired earlier, etc. It is no longer limited to relations between elements on a languagespecific basis, as Trubetzkoy assumed. Rather, markedness has come to refer to the universals of language (e.g., Jakobson 1963, 1990; Greenberg 1966), determined by Universal Grammar (Chomsky and Halle 1968, Kean 1975, and many others following them). Further, it has grown from a simple classificatory term to a predictive scientific concept (e.g., Kiparsky 1985, Calabrese 1995, Rice 1996, de Lacy 2002). There are many serious problems with the notion of markedness, as I outline in section 1. The result, I suggest, is that markedness is not predictive and hence, not a scientific concept. The root of the problem is this: due to the vagueness of the concept, markedness, it is unclear what markedness diagnostics, e.g. neutralization, simplicity, deletion, are actually diagnosing. What we are lacking is a clear understanding of the basis of markedness. I argue that it is predictability; that is, traditional markedness diagnostics are actually providing evidence for a linguistic element’s predictability within a system. An element with greater predictability patterns as less marked than a corresponding, less predictable, one. Predictability is determined by a complex of fac-
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