Could Morality Have a Source?

Chris Heathwood

43 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art

Abstract

It is a common idea that morality, or moral truths, if there are any, must have some sort of source, or grounding. It has also been claimed that constructivist theories in metaethics have an advantage over realist theories in that the former but not the latter can provide such a grounding. This paper has two goals. First, it attempts to show that constructivism does not in fact provide a complete grounding for morality, and so is on a par with realism in this respect. Second, it explains why it seems that morality in fact couldn’t have a source.

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References

1996The Sources of Normativity 1925An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.1989Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics 2008Internal and External Reasons 1972Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives 1989Dispositional Theories of Value 1952Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer 1996Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It

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2015Irreducibly Normative Properties 2013I—Pekka Väyrynen: Grounding and Normative Explanation 2016Moral Distinctiveness and Moral Inquiry 2023The Source of Normativity

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