RELIABILISM—MODAL, PROBABILISTIC OR CONTEXTUALIST

Peter Baumann

22 citations0/0 files storedGrazer Philosophische Studien

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Abstract

This paper discusses two versions of reliabilism: modal and probabilistic reliabilism. Modal reliabilism faces the problem of the missing closeness metric for possible worlds while probalistic reliabilism faces the problem of the relevant reference class. Despite the severity of these problems, reliabilism is still very plausible (also for independent reasons). I propose to stick with reliabilism, propose a contextualist (or, alternatively, harmlessly relativist) solution to the above problems and suggest that probabilistic reliabilism has the advantage over modal reliabilism.

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References

1986On the Plurality of Worlds 1983Knowledge and the Flow of Information.1976Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge 1979Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow 1979What is Justified Belief?1989Epistemology and Cognition.2012Philosophical Theories of Probability 1976Belief, Truth and Knowledge.

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2017The reliability problem for reliabilism 2019Against Knowledge Closure

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