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The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures
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The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures (2003)The Persistence of Corruption and Regulat…The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society (2008)The Political Economy of the …The cross-country pattern of corruption: economics, culture and the seesaw dynamics (2002)The cross-country pattern of …Electoral Rules and Corruption (2001)Electoral Rules and CorruptionThe causes of corruption: a cross-national study (2000)The causes of corruption: a c…Comparative Politics and Public Finance (2000)Comparative Politics and Publ…Rents, Competition, and Corruption (1999)Rents, Competition, and Corru…Aggregating Governance Indicators (1999)Aggregating Governance Indica…Corruption Around the World (1998)Corruption Around the WorldLegal Determinants of External Finance (1997)Legal Determinants of Externa…Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from Indonesia (1996)Informal Regulation of Indust…INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES (1995)INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PER…Protection For Sale (1992)Protection For SaleMenu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence (1986)Menu Auctions, Resource Alloc…A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence (1983)A Theory of Competition Among…Toward a More General Theory of Regulation (1976)Toward a More General Theory …THE WELFARE COSTS OF TARIFFS, MONOPOLIES, AND THEFT (1967)THE WELFARE COSTS OF TARIFFS,…Migration unemployment and development: a two-sector analysis. (1970)A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries (1995)Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis (1995)Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others? (1999)Estimating the Value of Political Connections (2001)Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China (2004)The Logic of Collective Action (1965)The Logic of Collective Action. (1966)The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)The analysis of household surveys (1997)Trade, Growth, and the Environment (2004)Political uncertainty and risk premia (2013)What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data (1995)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Law and Finance (1998)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)Investor protection and corporate governance (2000)An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1997)The quality of government (1999)The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century (2003)Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2005)Economics, Organization and Management. (1993)Corruption and Growth (1995)The Regulation of Entry (2000)Institutions and the Resource Curse (2006)Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990)Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1991)A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth (1992)Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation (1997)The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation (2001)The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. (1948)Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences (2000)All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust (2005)Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence (2006)Economic Theory and Western European Integration (1959)Allocative efficiency vs. X-Efficiency (1966)Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation (1974)Firm-Level Political Risk: Measurement and Effects* (2019)Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy (1993)Making Democracy Work (1994)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)Politically Connected Firms (2006)World Investment Report (2017)
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References

  • 1997Legal Determinants of External Finance9,776 cited
  • 2008The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society5,271 cited
  • 1995INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES5,158 cited
  • 1976Toward a More General Theory of Regulation4,771 cited
  • 1983A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence4,118 cited
  • 2000The causes of corruption: a cross-national study3,947 cited
  • 1992Protection For Sale3,302 cited
  • 1967THE WELFARE COSTS OF TARIFFS, MONOPOLIES, AND THEFT2,963 cited
  • 1998Corruption Around the World2,145 cited
  • 1999Rents, Competition, and Corruption1,763 cited
  • 1986Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence1,224 cited
  • 1999Aggregating Governance Indicators1,068 cited
  • 2001Electoral Rules and Corruption787 cited
  • 2000Comparative Politics and Public Finance771 cited
  • 1996Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from Indonesia649 cited
  • 2002The cross-country pattern of corruption: economics, culture and the seesaw dynamics

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