Conflict Management in Coalition Government

Abstract

Abstract What Blondel refers to is the paradox that without conflicting views dividing the government, cabinet decision-making would be unnecessary, while at the same time cabinets must avoid conflicts in order to survive (also see Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993). It stands to reason that Blondel’s paradox will be most keenly felt in coalition cabinets in which the rivalry between the governing parties is a constant source of conflicts. Because of this permanent threat to the stability of the government, coalition governance is supposed to consist of conflict avoidance rather than of conflict management. In this light, the coalition agreement discussed in Chapter 5 is the most important mechanism for conflict avoidance: it identifies and defuses as many conflicts as possible before the government takes office. Unforeseen conflicts, which nevertheless arise during the coalition’s incumbency, are postponed or hived off.

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