What do we really know about corporate hedging? A meta-analytical study

Abstract

Abstract This paper employs meta-analysis to aggregate and systematically analyze the mixed empirical evidence on the determinants of corporate hedging reported in 132 previously published studies covering data from more than 73,000 firms. Among the fourteen proxy variables analyzed by multivariate meta-analysis, three variables emerge as reliable explanatory factors for corporate hedging decisions supporting the bankruptcy and financial distress hypothesis: dividend yield (positive sign), liquidity (negative sign), and firm size (positive sign). Moreover, for tax-loss carry forwards (positive sign) and research and development (positive sign), our findings indicate a weak impact on corporate hedging behavior reflecting tax reasons, the coordination between financing and investment, and agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders. Regarding the asymmetric information and agency conflicts of equity hypothesis, we find no explanatory power. The further analysis of heterogeneity via meta-regression reveals several factors that determine the mixed empirical evidence reported in previous studies. First, the results indicate that studies analyzing firms from North America report, on average, a lower impact of leverage on the corporate hedging decision. Moreover, studies examining more recent data samples tend to find a weaker relation between tangible assets and hedging, R&D and hedging, respectively. Overall, our results encourage scientific research to put more emphasis on finer-grained examinations of hedging variations and to discover rationales of corporate hedging extending classical financial theories.

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