Wittgenstein and Gödel: An Attempt to Make ‘Wittgenstein’s Objection’ Reasonable†

Abstract

According to some scholars, such as Rodych and Steiner, Wittgenstein objects to Gödel’s undecidability proof of his formula |$G$|⁠, arguing that given a proof of |$G$|⁠, one could relinquish the meta-mathematical interpretation of |$G$| instead of relinquishing the assumption that Principia Mathematica is correct (or |$\omega$|-consistent). Most scholars agree that such an objection, be it Wittgenstein’s or not, rests on an inadequate understanding of Gödel’s proof. In this paper, I argue that there is a possible reading of such an objection that is, in fact, reasonable and related to Gödel’s proof.

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