Logical pluralism and normativity

Abstract

We are logical pluralists who hold that the right logic is dependent on the domain of investigation; different logics for different mathematical theories. The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications for our pluralism concerning normativity. Is there any normative role for logic, once we give up its universality? We discuss Florian Steingerger’s “Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic” (Synthese 94: 143–162) as a source for possible types of normativity, and then turn to our own proposal, which postulates that various logics are constitutive for thought within particular practices, but none are constitutive for thought as such.

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