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In his earlier contribution to the philosophy of life, Better Never To Have Been (OUP, 2006) Benatar presented two core arguments. According to his ‘asymmetry’ argument, whereas to begin living (or ‘to come into existence’) is always partly harmful and partly beneficial, not to begin living is never even partly harmful; and if this is so, then it is always better not to begin living than to begin living. According to his quality of life argument, the quality of every (human) life is poor. Once we discount quality of life judgments that are unduly influenced by our distorting optimistic biases, the argument went, we can see clearly that the amount, distribution, and axiological weight of every life's positive qualities (e.g., pleasure, desire-satisfaction, the goods on which ‘objective list theories’ focus) are swamped by the amount, distribution, and weight of its negative qualities (e.g., pain, desire-frustration, and objective list bads). The asymmetry argument plays no important role in Benatar's latest contribution. But the quality of life argument does: with minor modifications, it serves as one main element of the overall case that Benatar makes in The Human Predicament for his broadest pessimistic contention yet. Simply put, this contention is that, judged by any relevant measure, all lives are bad in the sense that they are regrettable or unfortunate—instances of a ‘tragic predicament’.
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