The private law effect of the EU market abuse regulation

Abstract

The Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)1 has been applicable in the EU/EEA since 3 July 2016. As regulatory provisions of this nature are classified as public law, any failure to comply with MAR will primarily affect the infringer’s relationship with the competent financial supervisor. In other words, the relevant financial supervisor can enforce these provisions under administrative law in the event of an infringement, for example by imposing an administrative fine. Basically, this is essentially no different from the situation under MAR’s predecessor—the Market Abuse Directive (MAD),2 as implemented in the various national legal systems. However, an infringement of the key provisions of MAR in any event also has an important effect on the private law relations between the infringer and the investing public. By ‘key provisions’ I mean (i) the prohibition of insider dealing (Article 14(a) in conjunction with Article 8(1) MAR); (ii) the prohibition of unlawful recommendation and disclosure (Article 14(b) in conjunction with Article 8(2) MAR and Article 14(c) in conjunction with Article 10(1) and (2) MAR, respectively); (iii) the prohibition of market manipulation (Article 15 in conjunction with Article 12 MAR) and (iv) the requirement of prompt public disclosure of inside information (Article 17 MAR).3

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