Scientific Antirealists Have Set Fire to Their Own Houses

Seungbae Park

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Philosophy and History of Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy, Science, and History

Abstract

Scientific antirealists run the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism. I argue that the argument from underconsideration backfires on antirealists??? positive philosophical theories, such as the contextual theory of explanation (van Fraassen, 1980), the English model of rationality (van Fraassen, 1989), the evolutionary explanation of the success of science (Wray, 2008; 2012), and explanatory idealism (Khalifa, 2013). Antirealists strengthen the argument from underconsideration with the pessimistic induction against current scientific theories. In response, I construct a pessimistic induction against antirealists that since antirealists generated problematic philosophical theories in the past, they must be generating problematic philosophical theories now.

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1982The Scientific Image.1999Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth 1981A Confutation of Convergent Realism 1979What is Justified Belief?1974Explanation and Scientific Understanding 1989Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?1989Laws and symmetry 1987The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.

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