Kant on Animal Minds

Abstract

Kant's Critical philosophy seems to leave very little room to account for the mental lives of animals, since the understanding, which animals lack, is required for experience and cognition.While Kant does not regard animals as Cartesian machines, he leaves them few resources for getting around in the world in a coherent and responsive way.In this paper I present Kant's account of animal minds.according to this picture, animals have representations of which they are not conscious, and these representations can give rise to inclinations through a form of reflection.While this account faces difficulties in accounting for the variety and complexity of animal behavior, it is impressive in its ingenuity, and it clarifies the role of various faculties and terms in the Critical philosophy.

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