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First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions With Secret Reservation Prices: INRA--Toulouse · Study

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ArticleFirst-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions With Secret Reservation Prices: INRA--Toulouse

Quang Vuong1994

Article1994

First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions With Secret Reservation Prices: INRA--Toulouse

Quang Vuong · Bernard Elyakime · Jean‐Jacques Laffont · Patrice Loisel

77 citations·0/0 files stored·Annals of Economics and Statistics

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

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2001A Law of Large Numbers: Bidding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Refuse Collection Contracts 2008The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions 1997Auctioning and Bargaining: An Econometric Study of Timber Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices 2016The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms 2006An Empirical Perspective on Auctions 2006Information Dispersion and Auction Prices 2003Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data 2017Hidden Reserve Prices with Risk-Averse Bidders

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Year1994

Typearticle

Published1994-01-01

VenueAnnals of Economics and Statistics

ISSN-L1968-3863

Languageen

Citations77

Files0 public / 0

ShelfAuction Theory and Applications

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openalex_workW2787421237

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