On Putting Knowledge ‘First’

Abstract

This chapter claims that various views which travel under the banner of ‘knowledge first’ epistemology betray subtle differences in just how it is that they respectively regard knowledge as ‘first’. It argues that these differences are problematic, in part because it is not straightforward to draw connections between certain of these views, which are, under closer inspection, more independent than they are often assumed to be. Its aim is, in the main, to tease apart various ‘knowledge first’ claims, and explore what connections they do or do not have with one another, in the service of a clearer understanding of just what the knowledge first theses are and how these theses might be evaluated.

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