Why Refugee Burden‐Sharing Initiatives Fail: Public Goods, Free‐Riding and Symbolic Solidarity in the EU

Abstract

Abstract Traditionally, differences in states’ refugee protection contributions have been attributed to the variation in countries’ structural pull‐factors such as their geographic location. However, policy choices, such as Germany's decision to open its borders for Syrian refugees in 2015, can also have a significant impact on the number of arrivals and constitute a puzzle that traditional approaches struggle to explain. This paper demonstrates that viewing refugee burden‐sharing through the lens of public goods theory can provide significant insights about refugee protection dynamics in the EU, in particular in the context of a sudden mass influx of migrants that threatens internal security. By highlighting how free‐riding and burden‐shifting dynamics can undermine the provision of collective goods during a refugee crisis, a public goods approach can advance our understanding of why countries sometimes accept disproportionate responsibilities for forced migrants and how the effectiveness of EU refugee burden‐sharing instruments can, and should, be strengthened.

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