Empathy, Mind, and Morals

Abstract

Early Greek philosophers doubled as natural scientists; that is a commonplace. It is equally true, though less often remarked, that numerous historical philosophers doubled as cognitive scientists. They constructed models of mental faculties in much the spirit of modern cognitive science, for which they are widely cited as precursors in the cognitive science literature. Today, of course, there is more emphasis on experiment, and greater division of labor. Philosophers focus on theory, foundations, and methodology, while cognitive scientists are absorbed by experimental techniques and findings. Nonetheless, there are sound reasons for massive communication between philosophy and cognitive science, which happily proceeds apace. On this occasion I shall not try to enumerate or delineate these lines of communication in any comprehensive fashion. I just wish to illustrate the benefits to philosophy in two domains: the theory of mind and moral theory. Though this may sound like an ambitious agenda, I shall in fact examine just a single phenomenon: empathy. Using that term first broadly and later narrowly, I shall argue that empathy may be the key to one sector of the philosophy of mind and to several sectors of moral theory. But whether empathy can in fact unlock any doors depends heavily on the outcome of empirical research in cognitive science.

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