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Can Corporations Be Held to the Public Interest, or Even to the Law?
16 references·4 citing·43 second hop
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this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1968Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach13,984 cited
  • 1776An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations13,952 cited
  • 1974Economic Analysis of Law2,573 cited
  • 2011Group Agency1,331 cited
  • 2011Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents1,073 cited
  • 2012The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public778 cited
  • 2006Political power and corporate control: the new global politics of corporate governance576 cited
  • 1999CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But How544 cited
  • 2013Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation523 cited
  • 1992The Transformation of American Law 1870–1960517 cited
  • 1981"No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment466 cited
  • 1997Socializing Capital370 cited
  • 1997Socializing capital: the rise of the large industrial corporation in America335 cited
  • 2014Profits without prosperity.333 cited

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1859
Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books
281 cited

Cited by

  • 2019The Anglo-American Misconception of Stockholders As ‘Owners’ and ‘Members’: Its Origins and Consequences37 cited
  • 2022‘Un-responsible’ Organization: How More Organization Produces Less Responsibility26 cited
  • 2022Managerial Discretion, Market Failure and Democracy8 cited
  • 2022Management & Law: The Forgotten Contribution of P. Selznick7 cited