Institutional adoption and maritime crime governance: the Djibouti Code of Conduct

Abstract

The Djibouti Code of Conduct plays a central role in addressing maritime piracy and armed robbery in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Assuming rational actors base diplomatic decisions on cost–benefit calculations, this paper argues that decision-makers consider existing policy models on interstate cooperation when drafting international agreements. Comparing state-to-state agreements on the combat of maritime crimes which are located in different world regions, and studying the causal mechanisms behind policy adoption, the benefits of adopting institutional features from existing institutions, and exchanging best practices are underlined. The results suggest that the Djibouti Code of Conduct is subject to and subject of an inter-regional learning process. Facilitated by the International Maritime Organization, the code drew heavily on counter-piracy experiences from Southeast Asia, and in turn influenced cooperation on illicit maritime activities in West and Central Africa. Interviews with decision-makers add to the understanding of the code’s drafting and highlight the potential of inter-regional synergies for diplomacy in the Indian Ocean region beyond maritime crime governance.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 34 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.