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JUSTIFIED GROUP BELIEF IS EVIDENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE GROUP BELIEF
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JUSTIFIED GROUP BELIEF IS EVIDENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE GROUP BELIEF (2018)JUSTIFIED GROUP BELIEF IS EVIDENTIALLY RE…What Is Justified Group Belief? (2016)What Is Justified Group Belie…Ideal rationality and logical omniscience (2015)Ideal rationality and logical…When Is There a Group that Knows? (2014)When Is There a Group that Kn…Reliabilism and Contemporary EpistemologyEssays (2012)Reliabilism and Contemporary …Group Agency (2011)Group AgencyOn the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification (2010)On the Relationship between P…Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification (2009)Internalism, Externalism, and…Group Knowledge Analyzed (2004)Group Knowledge AnalyzedThe Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions (1995)The Importance of Us: A Philo…Socializing epistemology: the social dimensions of knowledge (1995)Socializing epistemology: the…Reasons and Experience (1991)Reasons and ExperienceOn social facts (1989)On social factsBelief and Acceptance (1989)Belief and AcceptanceModelling collective belief (1987)Modelling collective beliefBelief, Truth and Knowledge. (1976)Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Belief, Truth and Knowledge (1973)Belief, Truth and KnowledgeCan groups be genuine believers? The argument from interpretationism (2021)Can groups be genuine believe…Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)Judgment under Uncertainty (1982)Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. (1984)Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes (2019)Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain (2019)Formulating Independence (2019)What is Justified Belief? (1979)Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. (1988)Knowledge in Perspective (1991)The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion (2010)The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019)Reasons First (2021)Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (1956)Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. (1982)Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciences (1994)Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction (2003)The Philosophy of Sociality (2007)Social Trust: A Cognitive Approach (2001)Multiple Routes for Social Influence: The Role of Compliance, Internalization, and Social Identity (2002)Analyzing Oppression (2006)?Doing the lesson? or ?doing science?: Argument in high school genetics (2000)Supporting and Promoting Argumentation Discourse in Science Education (2002)Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance (2007)Groups with minds of their own (2001)A cultural theory of international relations (2009)Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom? (2012)Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion (2003)Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (2003)The evolution of misbelief (2009)Computation and cognition: issues in the foundations of cognitive science (1980)Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? (1981)Competitive advantage: logical and philosophical considerations (2001)Imagine there are no leaders: Reframing leadership as collaborative agency (2014)The Microfoundations Movement in Strategy and Organization Theory (2015)Moral Realism (2003)
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  • 2021Can groups be genuine believers? The argument from interpretationism

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26 cited