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Does Unbundling Policy Authority Improve Accountability?
16 references·1 citing·37 second hop
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References

  • 1997What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters4,437 cited
  • 2002Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy3,748 cited
  • 1999Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective3,169 cited
  • 1996What Americans know about politics and why it matters2,050 cited
  • 2017The University of Chicago Law Review2,003 cited
  • 1988Task Complexity: A Review and Analysis1,629 cited
  • 2002Special Interest Politics1,566 cited
  • 2004The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government904 cited
  • 2006Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government737 cited
  • 1999Elections and Representation631 cited
  • 1999The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies575 cited
  • 2007The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability545 cited
  • 2001Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking515 cited
  • 2003Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence445 cited
  • 2009Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability240 cited
  • 1998

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An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests
234 cited

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  • 2019Representative Democracy as Defensible Epistocracy115 cited