The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizationsRenée Jørgensen2018-05-23articleSynthese242 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryFeminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 242 citations exist upstream.References198611. Reasons and Persons1977The Probable and The Provable1993An essay on belief and acceptance2011On the epistemic costs of implicit bias2018Probabilistic Knowledge1992Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context2013Belief, credence, and norms1989Belief and AcceptanceCited by2020Predict and Surveil2018The wrongs of racist beliefs2019Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs2020Algorithmic bias: on the implicit biases of social technology2019What we epistemically owe to each other2018Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment2020Varieties of Moral Encroachment2019Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations