Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform

Abstract

Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform explores the cognitive dimensions of evil and moral reform in Immanuel Kant’s mature ethical theory. Its questions include what self-deception is for Kant, why and how it is connected to evil, and how we achieve the self-knowledge that should take the place of self-deceit. Crucial related issues discussed in the book include the role of hedonism in Kant’s practical philosophy, the adequacy of Kant’s theory of character, Kant’s accounts of moral weakness and moral strength, the alleged universality of evil in human nature, how social institutions and interpersonal relationships facilitate self-knowledge, and the role of the ethical community in moral reform. Working with both Kant’s core texts on ethics and materials less often cited within scholarship on Kant’s practical philosophy (such as Kant’s logic lectures), this book addresses a significant gap in the existing literature, which generally favors—but does not adequately discuss or defend—Kant’s repeat allusions to the idea that evil requires self-deceit. Through its exploration of how self-deceptive rationalization and self-cognition relate, respectively, to evil and its overcoming, this book investigates, defends, and provides a new lens for understanding Kant’s treatment of evil while engaging the most influential—and often scathing—of Kant’s critics.

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