Freud’s psychoanalysis, contemporary cognitive/social psychology, and the case against introspection

Abstract

Although Freud and contemporary cognitive/social psychologists differ with regards to various traditions, vocabularies, methods, and areas of application, they agree in their criticism of the use of introspection as a means of inquiring about the mind. They share not only a strong outlook against introspection but both go so far as to make some outright arguments against introspection. Very briefly, it seems that both of these approaches conceive of introspection and the data stemming from it as hindrances to the construction of a science of mind. After presenting the theoretical assumptions and methodological underpinnings of contemporary cognitive/social psychology and Freud’s psychoanalysis, this article will compare them so as to highlight their differences and commonalities. The paper will conclude by arguing that both approaches appear to reject introspection as a method of inquiry because each understands psychology to be a natural science that is free from subjectivity.

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