A Kantian Case for Our Obligations to the Other Animals

Abstract

When we act rationally, we treat things that are good for us as if they were good absolutely. We choose to pursue them, and demand that others respect our choices, thus treating ourselves as ends in ourselves. This argument—Kant’s argument for the Formula of Humanity—establishes that there are two senses in which rationality commits us to the view that we are ends in ourselves. The demands that we make on others commit us to the view that we are ends in ourselves as autonomous lawmakers, and ground our duties to other rational beings. The demands that we make on ourselves when we choose to pursue our good commit us to the view that we are ends in ourselves as creatures who have a good, and ground our duties to other animals. The chapter also examines the difficulties this raises for Kant’s ideal of the Kingdom of Ends.

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