Evidence and morality in harm-reduction debates: can we use value-neutral arguments to achieve value-driven goals?

Abstract

Abstract It is common to argue that politicians make selective use of evidence to tacitly reinforce their moral positions, but all stakeholders combine facts and values to produce and use research for policy. The drug policy debate has largely been characterised in terms of an opposition between evidence and politics. Focusing on harm reduction provides useful ground to discuss a further opposition proposed by evidence advocates, that between evidence and morality. Can evidence sway individuals from their existing moral positions, so as to “neutralise” morality? And if not, then should evidence advocates change the way in which they frame their arguments? To address these questions, analysis of N = 27 interviews with stakeholders actively involved in drug policy and harm reduction debates in England, UK and New South Wales, Australia, was conducted. Participants’ accounts suggest that although evidence can help focus discussions away from values and principles, exposure to evidence does not necessarily change deeply held views. Whether stakeholders decide to go with the evidence or not seems contingent on whether they embrace a view of evidence as secular faith; a view that is shaped by experience, politics, training, and role. And yet, morality, values, and emotions underpin all stakeholders’ views, motivating their commitment to drug policy and harm reduction. Evidence advocates might thus benefit from devising strategies to morally and emotionally engage audiences. This paper aims to develop better tools for analysing the role of morality in decision-making. Using tools from disciplines such as moral psychology is relevant to the study of the politics of evidence-based policymaking.

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