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Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions

Vinícius Carrasco, Vitor Farinha Luz, Nenad Kos, Matthias Messner, Paulo Klinger Monteiro, Humberto Moreira

2018-06-01articleJournal of Economic Theory93 citationsclosed

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

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Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 93 citations exist upstream.

References

1999Infinite Dimensional Analysis

1999On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games

2005Robust Mechanism Design

2002Knightian decision theory. Part I

1987Game-theoretic analyses of trading processes

2015Robustness and Linear Contracts

1961Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms: Comment

2011Robust monopoly pricing

Cited by

2019Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting

2021Uncertainty in Mechanism Design

2021Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach

2019Simple versus Optimal Contracts

Details

Year2018

Typearticle

VenueJournal of Economic Theory

Languageen

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Identifiers

doi10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.005

openalex_workW2807601023

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