How Responsive Are Legislators to Policy Information? Evidence from a Field Experiment in a State Legislature

Abstract

Theories of legislative committees, lobbying, and cue‐taking assume information affects legislators' support for policy alternatives. However, there is little direct, empirical evidence to support this foundational assumption about legislative behavior. This article reports results from a field experiment in which state legislators were randomly assigned to receive policy research about pending proposals. Results show that policy information increased aggregate cosponsorship by 60% above baseline rates. For one bill covered critically, information diminished cosponsorship and roll‐call voting support. Results are broadly consistent with information signaling models' predictions about the importance of information to position taking.

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