No open-access location is known for this record yet.
No open-access location is known for this record yet.
I argue that Emilie du Châtelet's metaphysics of corporeal substance in the 1740s was a species of realism.This result challenges the ruling consensus, which takes her to have been decisively influenced by Leibniz, an idealist.In addition, I argue that du Châtelet's ontology of body is a mixture of realism and idealism, likewise non-Leibnizian.This, too, questions the scholarly consensus and opens the way for an overdue careful reassessment of her overall doctrine.I suggest that her view is best understood as dualism, a two-substance metaphysics that puts du Châtelet quite close to Christian Wolff.
Loading…
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 45 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.