A new puzzle about belief and credence

Abstract

Abstract I present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent. The first is the view thatShas a modal belief thatp(e.g.,Sbelieves that probably-p) if and only ifShas a corresponding credence thatp. The second is the view thatSbelieves thatponly ifShas some credence thatp. The third is the view that, possibly,Sbelieves thatpwithout a modal belief thatp. [Word Count: 85]

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