What is metaphysics? And how is it to be pursued? Elsewhere, I have defended the view that the central task of metaphysics is to chart the possibilities of being: knowledge of what is actual presupposes knowledge of what is possible—of what is really or metaphysically possible. According to this conception of the aim and content of metaphysical theory, metaphysics is above all concerned with identifying the fundamental ontological categories to which all entities, actual and possible, belong. It is, therefore, incumbent upon metaphysicians to explain what it is that grounds metaphysical possibility. This chapter argues that the only coherent account of the ground of metaphysical possibility and of our capacity for modal knowledge is a version of essentialism: a version that I call serious essentialism, to distinguish it from views which appear very similar to it but which, in fact, differ from it fundamentally in certain crucial respects.
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