Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting

Michael Nielsen · Rush T. Stewart

34 citations0/0 files storedThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.

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References

1979Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence.2002The Law of Group Polarization 1986Combining Probability Distributions: A Critique and an Annotated Bibliography 2005Epistemic Permissiveness 1938Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge.2009Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy 2004Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 1955Coherence and the axioms of confirmation

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