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Simple versus Optimal Contracts
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References

  • 1973Job Market Signaling16,329 cited
  • 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem2,127 cited
  • 2002The Theory of Incentives2,116 cited
  • 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,913 cited
  • 1979Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship1,285 cited
  • 1985Repeated Moral Hazard614 cited
  • 2005A Min-Max Solution of an Inventory Problem552 cited
  • 1992The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values485 cited
  • 1990The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values400 cited
  • 2015Robustness and Linear Contracts330 cited
  • 2017Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening167 cited
  • 2010A Model of Delegated Project Choice136 cited
  • 2014Mechanism Design and Approximation119 cited
  • 2013Calibrated Incentive Contracts

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