GATT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATION*

Dan Kovenock · Marie Thursby

109 citations0/0 files storedEconomics and Politics

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World Trade Organization Law International Relations and Foreign Policy Global trade and economics

Abstract

This paper analyzes GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An explicit agreement, such as GATT, may be violated at some positive cost in addition to retaliatory actions that might be induced by the violation. We interpret this cost as arising from “international obligation”, a phenomenon frequently mentioned in the legal literature on GATT. We focus on how international obligation affects two aspects of GATT‐DSP: unilateral retaliation and the effect of inordinate delays in the operation of DSP.

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References

1984Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information 1991Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships 1981THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON NEGOTIATED TARIFF ADJUSTMENTS 1982A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining 1980General Equilibrium Evaluations of Tariff-Cutting Proposals in the Tokyo Round and Comparisons with More Extensive Liberalisation of World Trade 1991Dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information 1982Tariff Retaliation from a Strategic Viewpoint 1987Game-modeling multilateral trade negotiations

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