A Business Ethics Theory of Whistleblowing Responding to the $1 Trillion Question

Abstract

Although the social contribution of whistleblowing is gigantic, whistle-blowers are often portrayed as disloyal or self-serving bounty hunters. However, whistleblowers frequently put themselves at great risk, and their situation is rendered more perilous by the failings of the US legal system. This chapter argues that the woeful state of legal affairs may be due in part to a lack of consensus on the parameters of legitimate whistleblowing. It suggests when whistleblowing should be considered a duty and when one can be excused from whistleblowing. The United States has a long history of legislation created to support whistleblowers, stretching back to 1863 and the administration of Abraham Lincoln. At that time, the United States was engaged in the Civil War and in order to provide itself with legal remedies against those who sought to unduly profit by selling substandard goods at premium prices, the government passed the False Claims Act (FCA), which provided whistleblower protections.

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