Tax avoidance in government-owned firms: Evidence from Italy

Elisabetta Mafrolla

15 citations0/0 files storedPublic Money & Management

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Corporate Taxation and Avoidance Economic and Fiscal Studies Taxation and Legal Issues

Abstract

This paper studies whether and why government-owned firms avoid taxation to a greater extent than wholly privately-owned firms do. By considering a sample of Italian listed corporations for the period between 2006 and 2011, it was found that government ownership had a systematically negative effect on corporate effective tax rate, with a prevalence of tax-planning policies focused on the long term. Managers of local government-owned firms focused on minimizing costs, even if this was to the detriment of national tax-revenue collection.

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1994Politicians and Firms 2000The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings 2010A review of tax research 2004What Determines Corporate Transparency?2008Long-Run Corporate Tax Avoidance 2007Are Family Firms More Tax Aggressive Than Non-Family Firms?2006Financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting: The influence of legal and political institutions 2007Theft and taxes☆

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