Constructing Rights of Nature Norms in the US, Ecuador, and New Zealand

Abstract

Governments around the world are adopting laws granting Nature rights. Despite expressing common meta-norms transmitted through transnational networks, rights of Nature (RoN) laws differ in how they answer key normative questions, including how to define rights-bearing Nature, what rights to recognize, and who, if anyone, should be responsible for protecting Nature. To explain this puzzle, we compare RoN laws in three of the first countries to adopt such laws: Ecuador, the US, and New Zealand. We present a framework for analyzing RoN laws along two conceptual axes (scope and strength), highlighting how they answer normative questions differently. The article then shows how these differences resulted from the unique conditions and processes of contestation out of which each law emerged. The article contributes to the literature on norm construction by showing how RoN meta-norms circulating globally are infused with differing content as they are put into practice in different contexts, setting the stage for international norm contestation.

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