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1. INTRODUCTION Vibrant public securities markets rely on complex systems of supporting institutions that promote the governance of publicly traded companies. Corporate governance structures serve: 1) to ensure that minority shareholders receive reliable information about the value of firms and that a company's managers and large shareholders do not cheat them out of the value of their investments, and 2) to motivate managers to maximize firm value instead of pursuing personal objectives. (1) Institutions promoting the governance of firms include reputational intermediaries such as investment banks and audit firms, securities laws and regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States, and disclosure regimes that produce credible firm-specific information about publicly traded firms. In this paper, we discuss economics-based research focused primarily on the governance role of publicly reported financial accounting information. Financial accounting information is the product of corporate accounting and external reporting systems that measure and routinely disclose audited, quantitative data concerning the financial position and performance of publicly held firms. Audited balance sheets, income statements, and cash-flow statements, along with supporting disclosures, form the foundation of the firm-specific information set available to investors and regulators. Developing and maintaining a sophisticated financial disclosure regime is not cheap. Countries with highly developed securities markets devote substantial resources to producing and regulating the use of extensive accounting and disclosure rules that publicly traded firms must follow. Resources expended are not only financial, but also include opportunity costs associated with deployment of highly educated human capital, including accountants, lawyers, academicians, and politicians. In the United States, the SEC, under the oversight of the U.S. Congress, is responsible for maintaining and regulating the required accounting and disclosure rules that firms must follow. These rules are produced both by the SEC itself and through SEC oversight of private standards-setting bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Emerging Issues Task Force, which in turn solicit input from business leaders, academic researchers, and regulators around the world. In addition to the accounting standards-setting investments undertaken by many individual countries and securities exchanges, there is currently a major, well-funded effort in progress, under the auspices of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), to produce a single set of accounting standards that will ultimately be acceptable to all countries as the basis for cross-border financing transactions. (2) The premise behind governance research in accounting is that a significant portion of the return on investment in accounting regimes derives from enhanced governance of firms, which in turn facilitates the operation of securities markets and the efficient flow of scarce human and financial capital to promising investment opportunities. Designing a system that provides governance value involves difficult tradeoffs between the reliability and relevance of reported accounting information. While the judgments and expectations of firms' managers are an inextricable part of any serious financial reporting model, the governance value of financial accounting information derives in large part from an emphasis on the reporting of objective, verifiable outcomes of firms. An emphasis on verifiable outcomes produces a rich set of variables that can support a wide range of enforceable contractual arrangements and that form a basis for outsiders to monitor and discipline the actions and statements of insiders. (3) A fundamental objective of governance research in accounting is to investigate the properties of accounting systems and the surrounding institutional environment important to the effective governance of firms. …
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