On objective and subjective epistemic modality again

Abstract

Abstract This aim of this chapter is to prove the linguistic reality of the distinction between objective and subjective epistemic modality as made in FDG, according to which the former modifies the Episode and the latter the Propositional Content. The chapter studies the two basic Spanish modal auxiliaries poder ‘can, may’ and deber ‘must’ and its Portuguese cognates dever and poder in order to see (i) which of the criteria (proposed by Hengeveld (1988) for the lexical expression of this distinction) yield testable criteria for the grammatical expression of epistemic modality and (ii) if the objective-subjective dichotomy somehow relates to the degrees of possibility and necessity expressed by these modal auxiliaries. With respect to (i), it is argued that there are two testable criteria, i.e. non-locatability in time and space and the boundedness to the ‘locutionary agent’ of propositions, for the identification of subjective auxiliary expressions. As for (ii), it turns out that the expressions of auxiliaries of necessity are prone to express subjective epistemic modality, whereas those of probability and possibility generally express objective epistemic modality.

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