Why computer simulations are not inferences, and in what sense they are experiments

Abstract

Abstract The question of where, between theory and experiment, computer simulations (CSs) locate on the methodological map is one of the central questions in the epistemology of simulation (cf. SaamJournal for General Philosophy of Science,48, 293–309, 2017). The two extremes on the map have them either be a kind ofexperimentin their own right (e.g. Barberousse et al.Synthese,169, 557–574, 2009; Morgan 2002, 2003,Journal of Economic Methodology, 12(2), 317–329, 2005; MorrisonPhilosophical Studies,143, 33–57, 2009; Morrison 2015; Massimi and BhimjiStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics,51, 71–81, 2015; ParkerSynthese,169, 483–496, 2009) or just anargumentexecuted with the aid of a computer (e.g. BeisbartEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science,2, 395–434, 2012; Beisbart and NortonInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science,26, 403–422, 2012). There exist multiple versions of the first kind of position, whereas the latter is rather unified. I will argue that, while many claims about the ‘experimental’ status of CSs seem unjustified, there is a variant of the first position that seems preferable. In particular I will argue that while CSs respect thelogicof (deductively valid) arguments, they neither agree with theirpragmaticsnor theirepistemology. I will then lay out in what sense CSs can fruitfully be seen as experiments, and what features set them apart from traditional experiments nonetheless. I conclude that they should be seen assurrogate experiments, i.e. experiments executed consciously on the wrong kind of system, but with an exploitable connection to the system of interest. Finally, I contrast my view with that of Beisbart (European Journal for Philosophy of Science,8, 171–204, 2018), according to which CSs are surrogatesforexperiments, arguing that this introduces an arbitrary split between CSs and other kinds of simulations.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 21 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.