Theory of mind and executive function: is there a developmental relationship?

Abstract

Abstract ‘Theory of mind’ is a label for the conceptual system that underlies our folk psychology with which we impute mental states to others and ourselves, that is, what we know, think, want, feel, etc. We want to highlight some, for present purposes particularly important, points in children’s acquisition of these concepts. A first sign of understanding people’s intentions comes from a study by Spelke et al. (1995; replicated by Sodian and Thoermer 1998) that by twelve months but not yet at eight months infants infer people’s intentions to grasp objects they look at. There is richer evidence that around eighteen months infants infer more complex intentions since they imitate the intention behind failed action attempts (Meltzoff 1995) and they understand differences in food preferences (Repacholi and Gopnik 1997). By eighteen months signs of understanding the mind bloom: children engage in and understand pretence (Leslie 1987; Piaget 1945/1962), they understand distress and engage in empathic comforting behaviour (Bischof-Kö hler 1988; Yarrow and Waxler 1975), they understand goals and the standards which they have to live up to (Kagan 1981), etc. These abilities sharpen over the next years; this is also reflected in an increase in their use of corresponding verbs, e.g. feel, want, pretend, know, think (Bartsch and Wellman 1995).

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