SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Hard and Soft Closing of Roads Towards Socially Optimal Routing
16 references·0 citing·48 second hop
Hard and Soft Closing of Roads Towards Socially Optimal Routing (2018)Hard and Soft Closing of Roads Towards So…Human Factors in Intelligent Transportation Systems (2014)Human Factors in Intelligent …A heuristic methodology to tackle the Braess Paradox detecting problem tailored for real road networks (2013)A heuristic methodology to ta…The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information (2012)The price of anarchy in games…Knowledge and networks: An experimental test of how network knowledge affects coordination (2012)Knowledge and networks: An ex…Congestion-aware Traffic Routing System using sensor data (2012)Congestion-aware Traffic Rout…Detecting Braess Paradox Based on Stable Dynamics in General Congested Transportation Networks (2009)Detecting Braess Paradox Base…The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation (2008)The Price of Stability for Ne…Price of Anarchy in Transportation Networks: Efficiency and Optimality Control (2008)Price of Anarchy in Transport…Case studies on the Braess Paradox: Simulating route recommendation and learning in abstract and microscopic models (2005)Case studies on the Braess Pa…The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology (2003)The price of anarchy is indep…Disappearing traffic? The story so far (2002)Disappearing traffic? The sto…A dynamic traffic equilibrium assignment paradox (2000)A dynamic traffic equilibrium…Braess's paradox in a loss network (1997)Braess's paradox in a loss ne…Braess' paradox: Some new insights (1997)Braess' paradox: Some new ins…Braess paradox: Maximum penalty in a minimal critical network (1997)Braess paradox: Maximum penal…Traffic assignment problem for a general network (1969)Traffic assignment problem fo…Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung (1968)Urban transportation networks: Equilibrium analysis with mathematical programming methods (1986)THE ECONOMICS OF TRAFFIC CONGESTION (1993)A capacity paradox in network design and how to avoid it (1998)Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess Paradox (2008)Bi-objective bilevel optimization of distribution center locations considering user equilibria (2015)Braess's paradox of traffic flow (1970)A new dynamic traffic model and the existence and calculation of dynamic user equilibria on congested capacity-constrained road networks (1993)Conjoint analysis for environmental evaluation (2008)Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows over Time (2010)Influence of eco-innovation on Indian manufacturing sector sustainable performance (2014)An Algorithm for the Discrete Network Design Problem (1975)The Prevalence of Braess' Paradox (1983)Loss Networks (1991)Braess's paradox in a queueing network with state-dependent routing (1997)Non-cooperative routing in loss networks (2002)Positive value of information in games (2003)Potential Games (1996)A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation (2000)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy (2009)Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy (2015)Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory (2016)Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (2006)Generated Traffic and Induced Travel Implications for Transport Planning (2010)From user equilibrium to system optimum: a literature review on the role of travel information, bounded rationality and non-selfish behaviour at the network and individual levels (2016)Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (2021)Trunk roads and the generation of traffic (1994)AN EVIDENCE BASE REVIEW OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRANSPORT BEHAVIOUR (2006)Insights on disruptions as opportunities for transport policy change (2013)Urban planning and degrowth: a missing dialogue (2021)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Algorithmic Game Theory (2007)Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient (2013)Mechanism Design and Approximation (2014)Mechanism design in large games (2014)Studies in the Economics of Transportation. (1956)Worst-Case Equilibria (1999)Algorithms, games, and the internet (2001)Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games (2003)Joint Strategy Fictitious Play With Inertia for Potential Games (2009)Human Performance Models and Rear-End Collision Avoidance Algorithms (2001)Do in-vehicle advanced signs enhance older and younger drivers’ intersection performance? Driving simulation and eye movement results (2007)Lane-Change Detection Using a Computational Driver Model (2007)A probabilistic multipath traffic assignment model which obviates path enumeration (1971)Traffic Equilibrium and Variational Inequalities (1980)The complexity of pure Nash equilibria (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1969Traffic assignment problem for a general network688 cited
  • 2008The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation532 cited
  • 2003The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology398 cited
  • 2008Price of Anarchy in Transportation Networks: Efficiency and Optimality Control287 cited
  • 1997Braess' paradox: Some new insights184 cited
  • 2002Disappearing traffic? The story so far164 cited
  • 2012The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information126 cited
  • 2014Human Factors in Intelligent Transportation Systems118 cited
  • 1997Braess's paradox in a loss network70 cited
  • 2000A dynamic traffic equilibrium assignment paradox67 cited
  • 2005Case studies on the Braess Paradox: Simulating route recommendation and learning in abstract and microscopic models60 cited
  • 2013A heuristic methodology to tackle the Braess Paradox detecting problem tailored for real road networks41 cited
  • 1997Braess paradox: Maximum penalty in a minimal critical network41 cited
  • 2012Knowledge and networks: An experimental test of how network knowledge affects coordination39 cited
  • 2012Congestion-aware Traffic Routing System using sensor data

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

23 cited
  • 2009Detecting Braess Paradox Based on Stable Dynamics in General Congested Transportation Networks16 cited
  • Cited by

    No citing works inside the corpus for this window.