Mobility, animals and the virtue of justice

Abstract

This chapter argues from a non-representationalist point of view that the capability of mobility — the practical freedom to move — serves to develop a virtue of justice. It shows that the scope of mobility justice is open-ended concerning the inclusion of nonhuman agents. The chapter outlines the representationalist approach to intentional action, and then provides a non-representationalist alternative. Phenotypical plasticity means that genetically identical animals may develop disparate phenotypes due to differences in environment. The work of Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil is useful in associating a non-representationalist understanding of perception with ethical theory. Associating mobility with the political-philosophical etiquette of 'capability' reflects such a material and relational stance, and situates mobility as a social justice concern. The mobilities literature has begun to draw on social justice theory to frame uneven mobilities as a justice issue for human populations.

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