A causal loop? The Commission’s new enforcement approach in the context of non-compliance with EU law even after CJEU judgments

Abstract

How policy stakeholders receive CJEU rulings will influence the European Commission’s reasoning on how much litigation makes sense in order to fight infringements of EU law. Therefore, the article focuses not only on the European Commission but later also on the member states. In the first part, recent data indicate both a limited capacity and new strategy of the Commission for suing non-compliance. The article’s later parts analyse the post-proceedings phase in the enforcement of EU law. Fresh data regarding the tip of the iceberg of non-compliance is presented regarding the CJEU’s ‘2nd judgments’ (Article 260.2 TFEU). Why do governments risk fines? How awkward do the related quarrels with the Commission get? The conclusions speculate that there might be a negative feedback loop between the great cost but only conditional success of enforcement, on the one hand, and the Commission’s propensity to litigate, on the other.

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