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Team Incentives and Bonus Floors in Relational Contracts
16 references·0 citing·46 second hop
Team Incentives and Bonus Floors in Relational Contracts (2020)Team Incentives and Bonus Floors in Relat…Collusion and the theory of organizations (2008)Collusion and the theory of o…Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation (2003)Team Incentives and Worker He…Relational Incentive Contracts (2003)Relational Incentive ContractsOptimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation (2003)Optimal Contracting with Subj…Optimal Incentives for Teams (2001)Optimal Incentives for TeamsFirm‐Wide Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental Airlines (2001)Firm‐Wide Incentives and Mutu…CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation (1996)CEO compensation: The role of…Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts (1994)Subjective Performance Measur…Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts (1993)Subjective Performance Measur…Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities (1990)Rationalizability, Learning, …Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment (1989)Implicit Contracts, Incentive…Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations (1986)Hierarchies and Bureaucracies…Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents (1984)Optimal Incentive Schemes wit…Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (1984)Optimal incentive contracts w…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityThe Theory of Organizations. (1972)The Theory of Organizations.The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Models of Man. (1959)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions (2004)Four formal(izable) theories of the firm? (2005)Can Principals Identify Effective Teachers? Evidence on Subjective Performance Evaluation in Education (2008)The economic institutions of capitalism firms, markets, relational contracting (1985)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem (2008)Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities (2011)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Chapter 2 The theory of the firm (1989)Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations (1991)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Beyond Incentive Pay: Insiders' Estimates of the Value of Complementary Human Resource Management Practices (2003)The Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues and Evidence (2003)Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy (2004)American Economic Review (2019)Transcendental Logarithmic Production Frontiers (1973)Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities (1986)Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization (1990)Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies (1994)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm (2002)The Social Psychology of Organizations. (1979)An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. (1983)The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems (1999)Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (2009)The Handbook of Organizational Economics (2013)Human Resource Bundles and Manufacturing Performance: Organizational Logic and Flexible Production Systems in the World Auto Industry (1995)Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India (2011)Field Experiments on Discrimination (2016)What Drives Differences in Management Practices? (2019)The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines (1997)
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References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1990Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities1,810 cited
  • 1986Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations1,227 cited
  • 2003Relational Incentive Contracts1,103 cited
  • 2003Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation983 cited
  • 1994Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts955 cited
  • 1993Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts921 cited
  • 1989Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment768 cited
  • 2001Optimal Incentives for Teams547 cited
  • 1984Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents506 cited
  • 1996CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation483 cited
  • 2003Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation424 cited
  • 1972The Theory of Organizations.386 cited
  • 2001Firm‐Wide Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental Airlines377 cited
  • 2008Collusion and the theory of organizations372 cited

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1984
Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
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