Of Providence and Puppet Shows

Abstract

Although the free-will reply to divine hiddenness is often associated with Kant, the argument typically presented in the literature is not the strongest Kantian response.Kant's central claim is not that knowledge of God would preclude the possibility of transgression, but rather that it would preclude one's viewing adherence to the moral law as a genuine sacrifice of self-interest.After explaining why the Kantian reply to hiddenness is superior to standard formulations, I argue that, despite Kant's general skepticism about theodicy, his insights pertaining to hiddenness also provide the foundation for a new theodicy that merits serious attention.1 See Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason; Lovering, "Inculpable Ignorance"; Maitzen "Demographics of Theism."Whether the problem of divine hiddenness is an independent challenge to theism or merely a particular instance of the problem of evil remains a matter of dispute.For recent discussion of the relation between the two problems, see Schellenberg, "The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil"; Dumsday, "How Divine Hiddenness Sheds Light"; Howard-Snyder and Green, "Hiddenness of God."2 See Hick, "Soul-Making Theodicy"; Murray, "Deus Absconditus"; and Swinburne, The Existence of God.

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