Nonuniform bribery

Abstract

We study the concept of bribery in the situation where voters are willing to change their votes as we ask them, but where their prices depend on the nature of the change we request. Our model is an extension of the one of Faliszewski et al. [9], where each voter has a single price for any change we may ask for. We show polynomial-time algorithms for our version of bribery for a broad range of voting protocols, including plurality, veto, approval, and utility-based voting. In addition we prove NP-completeness for a couple of our nonuniform bribery problems for weighted voters, and give approximation algorithms for two NP-complete bribery problems defined in [9].

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